

SIX NOTES ON THE TEXT OF EURIPIDES’ HIPPOLYTUS (271, 626, 680-1, 1045, 1123, 1153)*

I

	{Xo.}	ἄσημα δ’ ἡμῖν ἥτις ἐστὶν ἡ νόσος·
270		σοῦ δ’ ἂν πυθέσθαι καὶ κλύειν βουλοίμεθ’ ἄν.
271	{Tp.}	οὐκ οἶδ’ ἐλέγχουσ’· οὐ γὰρ ἐννέπειν θέλει.

271 ἐλέγχουσ’ Π³ (-ca) BAV A et ¹Σ^b et Σ^{mnv} et i Σ^{mnbv} : ἐλέγχους O et ¹Σⁿ : ἐννέπουσα M : [K]

To the coryphaeus’ request for information that could explain the nature of Phaedra’s illness, the nurse replies with a sentence that has resisted both interpretation and emendation. The reading transmitted by almost all the manuscripts, οὐκ οἶδ’ ἐλέγχουσ’, could only mean ‘I do not know that I am questioning her’ (LSJ s.v. *εἶδω B.3, KG 2.51 §482.1), and this is clearly absurd, both in itself and as an answer to the coryphaeus. In order for the participle to be concessive here (‘I do not know, although I am questioning her’), a particle or adverb would certainly be required to make clear to the audience that in this case they would have to abandon the normal meaning they would habitually expect for the construction οἶδα + participle and substitute for it one so different; and even so the meaning would be unsatisfactory, for we would expect her to say not, ‘I do not know, although I am questioning her’, but rather, ‘I do not know, although I have questioned her’ or ‘although I question her frequently’ or ‘all the time’. Diggle, approved by Mastronarde¹ and followed by Stockert and Halleran, prints the manuscripts’ reading with a comma, as though a slight pause would be enough to signify this syntactical change (and resolve this semantic problem), but I know of no parallel to support such a curious notion – a pause by itself is obviously not an adversative. One manuscript, O, transmits not ἐλέγχουσ’ but ἐλέγχους (so too the lemma to the scholium in N); this reading is printed by Wilamowitz² and Murray, but whether what is involved is a simple error or (less likely) a true variant reading, it is not much better. For what could the nurse possibly mean by saying, ‘I do not know questionings’ or ‘refutations’ (the only meanings of ἐλεγχος in the tragedians)?³ Besides, what she is ignorant about is not

* I owe thanks to my students in Pisa and Chicago, and to Alan Griffiths, Mario Telò, and the anonymous reader for this journal (none of whom should be blamed for my errors or held to share all my views). Works repeatedly cited in this article are listed at the end and are indicated in the text and footnotes simply by the name of the author.

¹ D.J. Mastronarde, rev. of Diggle, *CIP* 83 (1988), 151–60, at 154. His interpretation of the participle as ‘conative present/imperfect’ does not resolve the semantic difficulty of the combination with οἶδα.

² U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (ed.), Euripides *Hippolytos griechisch und deutsch* (Berlin, 1891), ad loc.

³ J.W. Fitton, rev. of Barrett, *Pegasus* 8 (1967), 17–43, at 28 refers ἐλέγχους not to questionings the nurse might have applied to Phaedra but to tortures the chorus might have applied to herself, and translates, ‘“I don’t know what kind of Third Degree you can try on me, because she won’t tell” i.e. “no matter how hard you press me, I can’t tell you because she is keeping quiet.”’ But this overloads the text impossibly and is if anything a proof that ἐλέγχους cannot be saved. Along the same lines, W. Stockert, ‘Bemerkungen zum Text des euripideischen

the possible means of investigating into Phaedra's condition: what she does not know is first, how to apply them with success in the present situation, and second, in consequence how to explain that condition.⁴

Kovacs obelises the whole phrase οὐκ οἶδ' ἐλέγχουσ', assuming that οὐκ οἶδ' is the remnant of an intrusive explanatory gloss,⁵ but this seems too desperate: these first two words are exactly what we expect the nurse to say and they fit seamlessly into the context. The difficulty lies only in ἐλέγχουσ', and it is this that Barrett obelises.⁶ Willink proposed ἐλέγχοις,⁷ but this is not really satisfactory: for the nurse to answer the coryphaeus' request by saying, 'I do not know by means of questionings' would suggest, absurdly, that she might know the answer by other means. Weil suggested οὐκ οἶδ' ἐλεγχθεῖσ' οὐ γὰρ ἐννέπειν θέλει,⁸ but, as Barrett remarks ad 271, this is disqualified not so much by the postponement of the particle as rather by the tense: 'ἐλέγχειν can be "try to get the truth out of, question" only in the pres. (impf., fut.), not in the aor., which is always the completed action, "get the truth out of" ...'⁹

If we wish to respect as far as possible Barrett's fine (but not, I think, over-fine) distinction between present and aorist, a much better meaning can be attained by a simpler emendation:

οὐκ οἶδ' ἐλέγχειν· οὐ γὰρ ἐννέπειν θέλει.

While οἶδα + participle means 'I know that I am doing x', οἶδα + infinitive means 'I know how to do x' (LSJ s.v. *εἶδω B.2, KG 2.69 §484.7). The coryphaeus has said, 'We would like to find out and hear from you (scil. what Phaedra's illness is)' and what the nurse replies is, 'I do not know how to try to get the truth out of her: for she refuses to say anything'. The only way that the nurse knows in general how to get at the truth in such situations is by asking, but in this particular case Phaedra's silence renders any ἐλεγχος that the nurse tries to apply futile: cf. a few lines later, *Hipp.* 297–9. Corruptions of one form of a verb into another one that is metrically (more or less) identical and semantically apparently possible (but in fact, in the particular context, logically nonsensical or at least inferior) are found not infrequently; the manuscripts of the *Hippolytus* alone furnish dozens of examples.¹⁰ In the present case the frequency of the construction οἶδα + participle may have facilitated the corruption.

Hippolytos, *Prometheus* 20 (1994), 211–33, at 217 proposes οὐκ οἶδ' ἐλεγχέ <μ>· οὐ, but even he admits that this does not fit with the following words.

⁴ These difficulties are not recognised by H. Lloyd-Jones, rev. of Barrett, *JHS* 85 (1965), 164–71, at 167, who defends ἐλέγχους.

⁵ See also D. Kovacs, *Euripidea Altera* (Leiden-New York-Köln, 1996), 29–30.

⁶ He is followed by M. Giusta, *Il testo dell'Ippolito di Euripide: congetture e croci* (Firenze, 1998), 61.

⁷ C.W. Willink, 'Some problems of text and interpretation in the *Hippolytus*', *ClQ* n.s. 18 (1968), 11–43, at 38–9.

⁸ H. Weil, 'Kritische Bemerkungen zu Euripides' Hippolytos', *RhM* 22 (1867), 345–61, at 346.

⁹ N. Wecklein (ed.), Euripidis *Hippolytus* (Lepzig, 1910), 71 lists the following further conjectures: ἄλλως ἐλέγχεις olim Vitelli, κάμνω γ' (vel ἀνῆκ') ἐλέγχουσ' Barthold, οὐκ οἶδα δηλοῦν F.G. Schmidt, ἔκαμον ἐλέγχουσ' Vitelli. For Barthold's conjecture, see T. Barthold, *Kritisch-exegetische Untersuchungen zu des Euripides Medea und Hippolytus*, Wissenschaftliche Beigabe zum Osterprogramm des Wilhelm-Gymnasiums in Hamburg 1887 (Hamburg, 1887), 33.

¹⁰ But on *Hipp.* 33 (where editors have traditionally considered the transmitted third person singular imperfect ὠνόμαζεν to be logically impossible and have printed instead Jortin's third person plural future ὀνομάσουσιν) see now H.M. Jackson, 'Euripides, "Hippolytus" 29–33', *Hermes* 124 (1996), 150–9.

II

626 νῦν δ' ἐς δόμους μὲν πρῶτον ἄξεσθαι κακὸν
μέλλοντες ὄλβον δωμάτων ἐκτίνομεν.

625–6 del. Bothe 626 ἐκτείνομεν MP (~gE)

Much confusion has been imported into the interpretation of this section of Hippolytus' tirade by the notion that it conflates two different and socially incompatible marriage customs: *ἔδνα* at 625–6, whereby the groom's family pays the bride's family a bride-price; and *φερνή* or *προίξ* at 628–9, whereby the bride's family pays the groom's family a dowry. There is no doubt that the latter lines do indeed refer to a dowry (*φερνάς* 629). But the assumption that lines 625–6 refer to the payment of a bride price¹¹ runs afoul of the facts (1) that the verb *ἐκτίνομεν*, if taken as a form of the verb *ἐκτίνω* 'to pay off, to pay in full' is the wrong verb for this meaning – as Barrett points out ad 625–6, '*ἐκτίνειν* (to pay in full by way of return or requital) is used only of posterior requital, not (as it would be here) of anticipatory payment' – and (2) that *ἐκτίνω* has a short iota, so that if *ἐκτίνομεν* is understood in this way the line is metrically defective. Obviously, the right way to set about dealing with this difficulty is to question first whether in fact we must accept the manuscripts' *ἐκτίνομεν* and if so understand it as deriving from *ἐκτίνω*, and to consider second whether there is really no alternative to referring these two lines to the practice of *ἔδνα*; to argue, on the contrary, as Barrett ad 625–6 and most other scholars do, that the verb must have this meaning here, that *ἔδνα* must be what is being referred to, and that the metrical error is proof that the line has been interpolated by a later writer who was no longer sure of the correct prosody of *ἐκτίνομεν* and did not notice that he was confusing two disparate marriage customs, represents a triumph of erudition over logic: the interpreter invents a nonsensical meaning, attributes it to an imaginary interpolator – and then blames him for not having managed to express it successfully.

Let us reconsider the lines in question in their context:

616 {Iπ.} ὦ Ζεῦ, τί δὴ κίβδηλον ἀνθρώποις κακὸν
γυναῖκας ἐς φῶς ἡλίου κατῴκισας;
εἰ γὰρ βρότειον ἤθελες σπείραι γένος,
οὐκ ἐκ γυναικῶν χρὴν παρασχέσθαι τόδε,
620 ἀλλ' ἀντιθέντας σοῖσιν ἐν ναοῖς βροτούς
ἢ χαλκὸν ἢ σίδηρον ἢ χρυσοῦ βάρος
παίδων πρίασθαι σπέρμα του τιμήματος,
τῆς ἀξίας ἕκαστον, ἐν δὲ δώμασιν
ναίειν ἐλευθέροισι θηλειῶν ἄτερ.
625 νῦν δ' ἐς δόμους μὲν πρῶτον ἄξεσθαι κακὸν
μέλλοντες ὄλβον δωμάτων ἐκτίνομεν.
τούτῳ δὲ δῆλον ὡς γυνὴ κακὸν μέγα
προσθεῖς γὰρ ὁ σπείρας τε καὶ θρέψας πατήρ
φερνάς ἀπόκισ', ὡς ἀπαλλαχθῆ κακοῦ.
630 ὁ δ' αὖ λαβὼν ἀτηρὸν ἐς δόμους φυτὸν
γέγηθε κόσμον προστιθεῖς ἀγάλματι
καλὸν κακίστῳ καὶ πέπλοισιν ἐκπονεῖ
δύστηνος, ὄλβον δωμάτων ὑπεξελών.

¹¹ This assumption goes back to the scholia on line 625.

Insufficient attention has perhaps been accorded to the fact that Hippolytus shows himself in this passage to be obsessed not only by women, but also by money, and that his diatribe against women is couched throughout in specifically economic language. Already his very opening words accuse them of being a *κίβδηλον κακόν*, expressing in terms of counterfeit coinage the accusation that, like Pandora, they may look valuable to the incautious but in fact are entirely devoid of value. His fantasy of procreation without women, then, is presented as a reasonable use of wealth in order to ensure the production of children of appropriate value: the proper amount of bronze or iron or gold, deposited in Zeus' temple, would purchase a son of the corresponding value; there would be no wastage (618–24). With *νῦν δ'* (625), we return from this charming fantasy to baleful reality: as it is, women cause vast economic havoc. This general point is illustrated by two complementary examples: first, the bride's father, who sired and raised her and therefore might be thought to nourish tender feelings for her if anyone did, is instead so happy to get rid of her that he is willing to pay a dowry to anyone incautious enough to be her husband (627–9); thereafter, the husband, who has welcomed the monster into his home, takes pleasure in squandering all his wealth on adorning her with fripperies until he has nothing left (630–3).

Thus the structure of the passage is clear and straight-forward: (1) a fantasy of economic procreation (619–24); (2) the wasteful reality (625–34), divided into (2a) a general statement of the economic disadvantages of the present system (625–7), followed by (2b.i) a first example, the dowry (628–9), and (2b.ii) a second example, the maintenance costs of the wife (630–4). The two examples are of course perfectly compatible with one another; the *φερνὴ* or *προίξ* system is presupposed from beginning to end. If we delete lines 625–6, as does Barrett, following Bothe, Nauck, Wecklein, and others, and followed by Diggle, Kovacs, Halleran, and Giusta,¹² we shall be left with line 627 alone to introduce section (2) of Hippolytus' argument. But it seems not to have been recognised that line 627 alone will not suffice to provide the general statement to which (2a) and (2b) supply corroborative examples, for it lacks the crucial *νῦν δέ* that signals a return from fantasy to reality. So we need a sentence before line 627 that does not refer to any specific wedding custom but instead offers a general statement to the effect that, as things stand, involving women in the practice of reproduction has devastating effects upon the household economy. This is just the job that lines 625–6 almost manage to do, and, with a minimum of tweaking, should be able to do. No one will suggest that they are Euripides' finest lines;¹³ but it would be absurd to suppose that lines 626–7 as we have them were interpolated in place of a perfectly good passage that did the same necessary job better than they do, and so, given that these lines seem so close to getting this job done, it seems perverse not to give them a chance to do so.

Obviously, *ἐκτίνομεν* will not convey the meaning required; but rather than accepting the word and condemning the sentence, it is more economical to preserve the sentence and emend the word. Pierson's proposal *ἐκπίνομεν*, defended by

¹² Giusta (n. 6), 96.

¹³ One sign of the alleged spuriousness of these lines is often found in the repetitions of *ἐς δόμους* (625 and 630) and *ὄλβον δωμάτων* (626 and 633). But given the frequency of careless repetition in Euripides (cf. J. Diggle, *Electra*, *JCS* 2 [1977], 110–24, at 118 n. 14 [= id., *Euripidea. Collected Essays* (Oxford, 1994), 161 n. 14] and id., *Studies on the Text of Euripides* [Oxford, 1981], 1–2; J. Jackson, *Marginalia Scaenica* [Oxford, 1955], 198–9, 220–2), this is not a valid objection to the authenticity of this passage.

Dindorf¹⁴ and Lloyd-Jones,¹⁵ and printed by Murray, is very close to the *paradosis*; but the meaning 'we drink dry' makes the metaphor seem more applicable to men who exhaust a house's wealth by expending it on lavish consumption for their own sake, not on fineries for their wives.¹⁶ Other proposed conjectures, such as ἐκτίομεν (Musgrave),¹⁷ ἐκθύομεν (Monk),¹⁸ ἐκτρίβομεν (Matthiae),¹⁹ ἐκτήκομεν (Kirchhoff),²⁰ and ἐκβάλλομεν (Wecklein)²¹ are either closer to the manuscripts' ἐκτίνομεν but unacceptable semantically or more satisfactory semantically but much farther from the manuscripts.

Blomfield suggested reading ἐκτείνομεν instead of ἐκτίνομεν,²² with two of the manuscripts (M and P); of course the two words are pronounced identically and so are frequently confused with one another. Barrett considers ἐκτείνομεν a negligible misspelling for an original ἐκτίνομεν; but M and P each come from one of the two families of manuscripts of the *Hippolytus*, and it is not impossible in principle that ἐκτίνομεν is instead a misspelling for an original ἐκτείνομεν. ἐκτείνω means 'to stretch something out'; if that is the right word here, it is obviously being used metaphorically: what would be the metaphor? Blomfield translated, 'we extend the wealth of our family';²³ but this does nothing to explain the metaphor or the logical connection of the sentence. Paley prints this reading and translates 'we lay low, we overthrow', citing *Med.* 585 ἐν γὰρ ἐκτενεί σ' ἔπος.²⁴ There it is an athletic metaphor, indicating how a boxer knocks out her opponent in a match and leaves him outstretched; it is supported by the frequent use of the verb in the active to refer to stretching out a body (here *Hipp.* 786) and in the passive to a body's lying outstretched (*Soph. Phil.* 858). But while this is perfectly appropriate for the violently confrontational argument between Medea and Jason it is unsupported by anything in the present context; besides, the connotations of suddenness and antagonism in the metaphor are unsuited to Hippolytus' meaning. Alternatively, we might note that the same verb also means, in attempting to attain some goal, to strain to the utmost some resource, concrete or abstract (LSJ s.v. ἐκτείνω III): a horse (*Xen. Cyr.* 5.4.5) or sail (*Plato Prot.* 338A), eagerness (*Hdt.* 7.10.η') or competitive spirit (*Dem.* 60.30). But all of these passages suggest that the resource in question is not being squandered wastefully, but rather is being exploited usefully and purposefully in order to achieve a meaningful goal. So this usage too of ἐκτείνω seems inappropriate here.

¹⁴ L. Dindorf (ed.), *EYPIIIIΔΟΥ ΔΡΑΜΑΤΑ*. Euripidis *Fabulae*, vol. 1 (Leipzig, 1825), 1.485.

¹⁵ Lloyd-Jones (n. 4), at 168.

¹⁶ Perhaps, too, the metaphor is somewhat too vulgar for tragedy (so e.g. Monk, cf. Duncan, 196 ad 622); in fact the only parallel is from comedy, Plato *Comicus* 9 Kassel-Austin: οὐδ' ὅστις αὐτῆς ἐκπίεται τὰ χρήματα. But tragedy certainly does sometimes admit words one would not expect to find outside of comedy (cf. especially P.T. Stevens, *Colloquial Expressions in Euripides* [Wiesbaden, 1976] and now C. Collard, 'Colloquial language in tragedy: a supplement to the work of P.T. Stevens', *CIQ* 55 [2005], 350–86); Dindorf (n. 14) ad loc. cites in support of Pierson's conjecture *Rhe.* 626.

¹⁷ S. Musgrave (ed.), *EYPIIIIΔΟΥ ΤΑ ΣΩΖΟΜΕΝΑ*. Euripidis *quae extant omnia*, vol. 1 (Oxford, 1778), 496 ad 631.

¹⁸ Cited from Duncan, 196–7 ad 622, and A. Matthiae (ed.), Euripidis *Tragoediae et fragmenta*, vol. 7 (Leipzig, 1823), 54 ad 621.

¹⁹ Cited from Matthiae (n. 18), 54 ad 621.

²⁰ Cited from Wecklein (n. 9), 75.

²¹ Wecklein (n. 9), 87.

²² Cited from Matthiae (n. 18), 54 ad 621.

²³ Cited from Matthiae (n. 18), 54 ad 621.

²⁴ F.A. Paley (ed.), *Euripides, with an English Commentary*, vol. I (London, 1872), 203.

Given that neither ἐκτίνομεν nor ἐκτείνομεν nor any obvious correction based upon ἐκτίνομεν yields a satisfactory sense, it seems best to conjecture on the basis of ἐκτείνομεν. Palaeographical considerations suggest the emendation ἐκτέμνομεν, an easy mistake in uncials (EKTEMNOMEN > EKTEINOMEN):

626 νῦν δ' ἐς δόμους μὲν πρῶτον ἄξεσθαι κακόν
μέλλοντες ὄλβον δαμάτων ἐκτέμνομεν.

Like the simple τέμνω (LSJ, s.v. τέμνω IV.3), ἐκτέμνω can mean 'to cut down, plunder, destroy' (LSJ, s.v. ἐκτέμνω I.3, III), whereby the literal meaning probably derives from the practice of ravaging an enemy's countryside during wartime (cf. Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 9.57); the prefix ἐκ- can be understood to underline the completeness of the action. This meaning makes perfect sense here: Hippolytus is complaining that, as things stand, given that we men – not some men, not just prospective grooms, but *all* of us men, as entailed by the string of precedents ἀνθρώποις (616), βροτοῦς (620), ἐλευθέροις (624) – are going (μέλλοντες) to bring women into our households and thereby to introduce this evil into them for the first time – πρῶτον, first since, in his fantasy, men had previously lived in houses free of women²⁵ –, we destroy completely (ἐκτέμνομεν) the finances of our households. Hippolytus' views are perverse and his reasoning aberrant; but his text at least is perhaps not quite as far off the mark as has sometimes been thought.

III

680 {Χο.} φεῦ φεῦ· πέπρακται, κοῦ κατάρθωνται τέχναι,
681 δέσποινα, τῆς σῆς προσπόλου, κακῶς δ' ἔχει.
{Φα.} ὦ παγκακίστη καὶ φίλων διαφθορεῦ,
οἷ' εἰργάσω με.

Who speaks lines 680–1? To answer this question we must first try to clarify who sings the preceding lyric ode (668–79). For if it is the chorus that sings this ode, then the immediately following trimeters may be spoken by the coryphaeus (though they may also be spoken by others instead); but if it is a character who sings the ode, then by the rules of fifth-century tragedy that same character cannot then go on to speak the trimeters as well.²⁶ Such trimeters are usually spoken by the coryphaeus, but there are enough examples in Sophocles (*Aj.* 368, 392–3, 410–11: after Ajax's monody Tecmessa speaks, alternatively to the coryphaeus) and Euripides (*Alc.* 404–5: after the child's monody Admetus speaks, alternatively to the coryphaeus), one of them in this very play (*Hipp.* 1389–90: after Hippolytus' monody Artemis speaks), that if we determine that the ode was sung by a character then we can on principle exclude only that same character as a candidate for the speaker of the trimeters.²⁷

All the manuscripts except A (and B *in rasura*) assign the ode to the chorus, and indeed it would hardly surprise us if the chorus were to express some degree of

²⁵ The notion that πρῶτον refers to a narrative sequence (which then causes the perplexity that no 'second' follows) is found in the scholia to line 625 (but as only one possibility), linked to the interpretation of the sentence as referring to ἔδνα.

²⁶ W. Barner, 'Die Monodie', in W. Jens (ed.), *Die Bauformen der griechischen Tragödie*, (Munich, 1971), 277–320, at 303–4.

²⁷ At *Rhe.* 915 the Muse switches from her monody to trimeters – the only such case in the corpus of Attic tragedy, and one of many anomalies in this play: cf. W. Ritchie, *The Authenticity of the Rhesus of Euripides* (Cambridge, 1964), 339–40.

sympathy with Phaedra's terrible situation; but in fact it is not their own fate that is directly at stake in what has happened, and such an extreme of personal desperation as this song expresses, especially in its final words *κακοτυχεστάτα γυναικῶν ἐγώ*, clearly goes far beyond the limits of what we can reasonably assign to even the most compassionate chorus. With whom are the chorus supposed to be contrasting themselves with the prominently placed *ἐγώ*? And if the chorus can say of themselves, 'Of all women, it is I who am the most evil-fated', what then will they say of Phaedra? Besides, the ode shifts back and forth between first person plurals (*ἔχομεν* 670, *σφαλεῖσαι* 671, *ἐτύχομεν* 672, *ἡμῖν* 677) and first person singulars (*ἐξάλυξω* 673, *κρύψω* 674, *ἐγώ* 679) in a way that suggests that a solo singer is alternately focussing on her own situation and her involvement with one or more other women, rather than that a chorus is singing. Hence it is not surprising that no modern editor assigns these lines to the chorus.²⁸

Kovacs, following Smith²⁹ and Østerud,³⁰ assigns them instead to the nurse, arguing that they are out of character for Phaedra: 'she has not been a proponent of craftiness, she does not believe she has gotten her deserts (cf. 682–7, 690), and she is not the one to wish for a god to help her unjust deeds'.³¹ None of these objections seems to me to be unanswerable: already by accepting the nurse's proposal to make use of love magic (507–24) Phaedra had involved herself in an attempt to use craftiness and certainly she will not be able to disprove any eventual accusation of blame for the nurse's actions nor, perhaps, will she be able to shirk an inner sense of responsibility for them (even if she of course had not had in mind the particular kind of craftiness that the nurse intended to apply to Hippolytus); it is not so much that she believes that she herself has got her just deserts but rather that by her unknowing but none the less unjust consent to the nurse's unjust actions (*ἀδίκων ἔργων* 676), she herself and the nurse have helped make the opprobrium Hippolytus cast upon all womanhood seem justified (*ἐτύχομεν δίκας* 672 is clarified by the immediately following *ὡ γὰ καὶ φῶς*, an evident reference to the very first words with which Hippolytus burst upon the stage, *ὦ γαῖα μητὴρ ἡλίου τ' ἀναπτυχαί* 601);³² and the polar wish for a god or mortal to help is a topos of Greek literature, not out of place in almost any character's mouth. As positive arguments in favour of assigning the lines to Phaedra, it should be pointed out that the tone of the whole ode echoes precisely her iambic reaction while eavesdropping outside the palace (*ὦ δυστάλαινα τῶν ἐμῶν παθημάτων* 570), and that the reference to the urgency or, in such desperate circumstances as these, to the impossibility of hiding this painful deed (*πῶς δὲ πῆμα κρύψω, φίλαι*; 674) picks up a recurrent theme of the anxieties and

²⁸ Giusta (n. 6), 99–100 and C.W. Willink, 'Further critical notes on Euripides' *Hippolytus*', *CQ* 49 (1999), 408–27, at 415–17 try valiantly, but in vain, to defend the attribution of this ode to the chorus; line 679 remains an insuperable stumbling block, not because of the first-person singular (the only point Willink notes) but because of the claim to unique, individual suffering (as contrasted with whom?). Willink also proposes deleting lines 680–81, implausibly; his claim, 'Choral lyric may be followed by a choral approach-announcement, as at *Alc.* 1006; but speech does not otherwise follow a lyric stanza without a change of speaker' (417) is perfectly true but does not in the least require that we delete these lines.

²⁹ W.D. Smith, 'Staging in the central scene of the *Hippolytus*', *TAPhA* 91 (1960), 162–77, at 169–70.

³⁰ S. Østerud, 'Who sings the monody 669–79 in Euripides' *Hippolytus*?' *GRBS* 11 (1970), 307–20.

³¹ Kovacs 189 n. 31; so too Kovacs (n. 5), 30–1.

³² This presupposes that Phaedra has heard the scene between Hippolytus and the nurse – not an uncontroversial view, but see below.

reflections which are particularly characteristic of her (239–49, 321, 393–7, 403–4, 415–18, 713–14, 719–21). A further objection against assigning this ode to the nurse is that doing so would give her too much dramatic prominence: the play is about the fate of Phaedra and Hippolytus, not about the nurse's, and having the nurse sing these lines would mislead the audience into thinking that the nurse's subjectivity and suffering were more important than they are – monodies are almost always sung by protagonists.³³

One last objection to giving the ode to the nurse resides in the word *φίλοι* (674): the nurse is a slave, the chorus are free-born women (*παῖδες εὐγενεῖς Τροζήνιαι* 710), and in tragedy it almost never happens that a slave from one household addresses free-born characters from another household as *φίλος*. Of the roughly five dozen other instances of vocative *φίλοι* and *φίλταται* in Greek tragedy, there is only a single passage that may provide an exception to the rule that they are addressed either by a noble character to the chorus or by the chorus to a noble character or by the chorus to one another: at *Andr.* 802 Hermione's nurse begins an address to the chorus with the words *ὦ φίλταται γυναικες* (802), and later in the same speech she calls them *φίλοι* (816). But before we hasten to conclude that this passage would support the attribution of the ode in the *Hippolytus* to the nurse, several points must be borne in mind. First, just who are the chorus of the *Andromache*? They are identified only as women of Phthiotis (*Φθιάς* 119) and it is far from clear what exactly their status is: they refer to the house of Neoptolemus as *οἴκους δεσποτῶν ἐμῶν* (141–2) and even address Hermione directly as their *δέσποινα* (232);³⁴ they do speak of a husband and marriage as possibilities for themselves (469–70), but this might be a choral generalisation relevant to people in general; they say they would rather have noble and wealthy birth or none at all (766–79), but this too may be merely generalising. Stevens raises the possibility that they are 'perhaps members of the household of Hermione'.³⁵ Second, the nurse's speech is part of an urgent attempt to involve the chorus in saving Hermione at what seems a desperate moment, and indeed climaxes in her (impossible) request that they enter the house and save her:

ὕμεις δὲ βᾶσαι τῶνδε δωματῶν ἔσω
θανάτου νιν ἐκλύσασθε· τῶν γὰρ ἡθάδων
φίλων νέοι μολόντες εὐπιθέστεροι.

(817–19)

Does the nurse mean that the chorus are newcomers (*νέοι*) as opposed to old friends, or new friends (*νέοι φίλοι*) as opposed to old ones? In either case what kind of reasoning is this, and moreover what right does she have to welcome strangers into her mistress's house? Are the chorus free citizens of Phthiotis or are they members of Neoptolemus' household, perhaps of some outlying estate? Maybe in Thessaly the distinction is moot at the best of times – to say nothing of the current emergency in which the usual authorities are absent and all hell has broken loose. In any case this episode of the *Andromache* does not seem to provide any solid support for attributing the ode of the *Hippolytus* to Phaedra's nurse.

³³ Barner (n. 26), 282–5. Neither of the two exceptions to this rule – the child in *Alc.* and the Phrygian in *Or.* – can support assigning the ode in question to the nurse: for in both of these cases the character who sings the ode is introduced for this sole purpose and does not appear elsewhere in the play, so that there can be no danger of mistaking for an enhancement of the importance of the character what in fact is only an interlude (the one designed to increase the pathos of Alcestis' death, the other as a late experiment in dramatic and musical technique).

³⁴ See below in this section for the importance of this latter usage.

³⁵ P.T. Stevens (ed.), Euripides *Andromache* (Oxford, 1971), 110 ad 117–46.

All in all, we seem to have no other option than to assign the song to Phaedra herself and to accept the consequences of our doing so. One of these consequences regards our understanding of Phaedra's character: evidently she feels that she really is ultimately responsible, or at least can no longer manage successfully to avoid blame, for having allowed the nurse to try craftiness, and she recognises in the ensuing disaster a situation from whose consequences she cannot escape; although she and we both know that she is in fact guiltless and has fallen victim to divine malice and human bungling, none the less she has put herself unwittingly into an inextricably disastrous situation and she accepts that there is no way that she can save herself from it. For someone as deeply concerned with her public reputation as she is, the fact that she knows herself to be (at least partially) innocent must weigh far less than the fact that she no longer is in a position to be able to prove it.

The other consequence regards the staging of this scene: it becomes clear that Phaedra is indeed present on stage during the altercation between the nurse and Hippolytus, even if she does not participate in it. This point requires at least a brief further discussion, for a number of recent scholars have argued the contrary. The suggestion by Smith,³⁶ followed by Østerud³⁷ and Kovacs, that Phaedra leaves the stage at line 600 and returns at 680, which is partly responsible for their assignment of the monody to the nurse, is a thoughtful and original response to genuine problems in the staging of the scene between Hippolytus and the nurse – but it must be firmly rejected. (1) Does Phaedra hear Hippolytus' speech or not? His own words are so furious and self-contradictory (cf. especially 656–8 vs 612 and the overt threat of 661–3) that even if she has heard him say that he will respect his vow, it is none the less quite understandable that she might conclude that sooner or later he will inevitably lose his temper (as she has seen him do spectacularly here) and break it. (2) Why do Hippolytus and the nurse ignore Phaedra and only speak of her in the third person if she is present on stage? In order to explain this, we need not presume, implausibly, that she is hiding behind a statue (e.g., Halleran ad 601–68) or cowering at one side of the stage (Barrett ad 601–15, 616ff.). There is some merit in the suggestion of Ley and Ewans that while she is listening at the door (which is what she is doing when we last hear her, 600) Hippolytus and the nurse burst through it and rush out towards the orchestra without even noticing her, and then continue their angry interchange while Phaedra stands behind them, ignored by them but visible to the audience;³⁸ on this view, when Hippolytus storms off along one of the *eisodoi* towards the woods (668), he may never even have been aware of her presence. But scholars who have discussed this problem do not seem to have noticed that there is an earlier scene in this same play in which Phaedra is discussed in the third person as though she were absent even though she is present on stage: at lines 267–87, when the coryphaeus and nurse speak about the veiled Phaedra in the third person just as Hippolytus and the nurse do in the passage under consideration. Evidently, the act of veiling Phaedra suffices to break any possibility of discursive contact between the other characters and herself:³⁹ might

³⁶ Smith (n. 29), 169–71.

³⁷ Østerud (n. 30). See now L.P.E. Parker, 'Where is Phaedra?', *Greece & Rome* 48 (2001) 45–52, for a judicious discussion.

³⁸ G. Ley and M. Ewans, 'The orchestra as acting area in Greek tragedy', *Ramus* 14 (1985), 75–84, at 76–7.

³⁹ On the dramatic grammar of veiling and unveiling cf. especially M. Telò, 'Per una grammatica dei gesti nella tragedia greca (I): cadere a terra, alzarsi, coprirsi, scoprirsi il volto', *md* 48 (2002), 9–75.

this be what happens in this scene too? (3) How, if Phaedra exits, does she do so? She cannot go through the central door, for this is the very same place from which her fiercest enemy is in the act of coming out at that very moment: to bump into Hippolytus and the nurse as they stormed out would be irresistibly comic, and it would be quite incomprehensible in that case that they go on to ignore her. But there is no other door on the tragic stage for her to go through: Grene invents *ad hoc* a side door of the palace through which she can retire,⁴⁰ but this is a comic usage, not a tragic one. Nor can she be imagined to go out through an *eisodos* (whither?). Short of being lifted out of her predicament by a *mêchanê*, she is stuck on the stage. (4) Finally, no one who hears a character say οὐκ οἶδα πλὴν ἐν· κατθανεῖν ὅσον τάχος, τῶν νῦν παρόντων πημάτων ἅκος μόνον (599–600) and sees her then immediately leave the stage can have any doubt that she is going off to kill herself and will not be seen alive again; when, on this view, she turns up alive without any explanation at 680, it is hard to imagine a spectator who will not be greatly perplexed. Smith⁴¹ and Østerud⁴² cite as parallels scenes from *Ag.*, *Aj.* and *Med.*: but in none of these cases is there the same emphasis upon the immediacy of the planned suicide or murder as is conveyed by Phaedra's ὅσον τάχος (599), and so the delay of the fulfillment of the announcement is not so troubling. There is nothing in Clytemnestra's or in Medea's words to indicate that they are just about to perform the murders; and even Ajax's θάσσον (581) and ὥς τάχος (593) refer not to his suicide but to the closing of the tent.

If, then, Phaedra is on stage and sings lines 668–79, who speaks the following trimeters? The manuscripts and scholia assign them to the coryphaeus; as we saw above, this is a perfectly possible solution. But is it the best solution? Giving them to the coryphaeus entails the following stage action: Phaedra sings her desperate monody, the coryphaeus reports to her that things have turned out ill, and Phaedra, ignoring her words completely, reacts not by responding to them but by launching into an attack upon the nurse. Why does the coryphaeus tell Phaedra in these two trimeters exactly the same information that Phaedra in her monody has demonstrated that she already knows?⁴³ Why does the coryphaeus intervene with this kindly meant even if useless report, and if she does so why does Phaedra ignore her compassion so completely? What is the nurse doing during this time?

Would it not be more economical, and make for a far more effective staging, if these two lines were spoken to Phaedra not by the coryphaeus, but by the nurse herself?

680 {Tr.} φεῦ φεῦ· πέπρακται, κοῦ κατώρθωνται τέχναι,
681 δέσποινα, τῆς σῆς προσπόλου, κακῶς ἔχει.

It is surely most appropriate for the nurse to be the speaker who (either in a moment of desperate courage or as a last-ditch attempt at self-exculpation) reports to Phaedra the failure of the attempt she herself has undertaken, and to whom Phaedra's tirade is directed as an immediate reply. Indeed, this was proposed by

⁴⁰ D. Grene, trans., *Hippolytus*, in D. Grene and R. Lattimore (edd.), *The Complete Greek Tragedies*, vol. 3 (Chicago, 1942), 157–221, at 188.

⁴¹ Smith (n. 29), 166.

⁴² Østerud (n. 30), 319.

⁴³ The difficulty is noted by Smith (n. 29), 170 and Østerud (n. 30), 314, but since they do not think of assigning these trimeters to anyone other than the coryphaeus they use it as further evidence that the monody should be sung by the nurse.

Reiske and supported by Monk;⁴⁴ but it was rejected without argument by Valckenaer in 1768⁴⁵ and by Matthiae in 1825,⁴⁶ and since then seems to have been completely forgotten.⁴⁷ Yet the suggestion is dramatically far superior to the traditional assignment of these lines, and it is worth resurrecting. It might be objected to this proposal that it could seem inconsistent for the same nurse to express helpless despair in these lines 680–1 and then a hopeful pragmatism only a little later in line 705; yet precisely such inconsistency is characteristic of the nurse, who first reacted to Phaedra's announcement of her desire for Hippolytus with suicidal desperation (353–61) but then only a little later managed to pull herself together and offer her shamelessly pragmatic *δεύτεραι φροντίδες* (433–81).

Further evidence, though perhaps not quite proof, to support the attribution of these lines to the nurse is provided by the address *δέσποινα*, which is much more appropriate in the nurse's mouth than in the coryphaeus': elsewhere in this play the term is applied eight times to gods (74, 82, 117, 228, 415, 522, 1325, 1395), but of the other five passages in which it occurs in the play, and in which it is applied to humans, in four it refers to Phaedra from the nurse's point of view (nurse to Phaedra 433, 695; Hippolytus to nurse about Phaedra 662; nurse about Phaedra 777; the exception is 130, on which see immediately below); one of these latter passages occurs only fifteen lines after the passage in question. So too, *δεσπότης* refers either to gods (88⁴⁸, 460) or, if to humans, then to the master from the point of view of his slave (nurse to her masters 287, nurse about Hippolytus as a potential master to Phaedra's children 308, Hippolytus to nurse about Theseus 590, nurse about her masters 787, messenger⁴⁹ about Hippolytus 1188, 1197, 1219). Of course the Troezenian chorus are subjects of Phaedra who is their queen, and they refer to her in the third person with a number of nouns designating her royal status (*δέσποινα* 130; *βασίλεια* 158, 175; *βασιλῆς* 267, 778; *τύραννος* 363; *ἄνασσα* 755, 783); but when they speak directly to her they never

⁴⁴ Duncan, 211 ad 678f. citing [Monk] from *Classical Journal* vol. 6, p. 81: 'Hos duo versus perite admodum Nutrici tribuit Reiskius: ut manifesto patet ex initio orationis Phaedrae ad Nutricem conversae'.

⁴⁵ Duncan, 211 ad 678: 'Ista, προϊούσης τῆς τροφῆς κατηφούς ὁ Χόρος φησὶν, ut recte Schol. admonet; nihilque adeo est, cur Nutrici cum viro doctissimo tribueremus'.

⁴⁶ Matthiae (n. 18), 59 ad 675: 'Sed praestat scholiastem sequi'.

⁴⁷ I find no mention of it later than Wecklein (n. 9), 76 except for an unargued dismissal at Willink (n. 28), 417.

⁴⁸ The construction of this sentence is much debated. (1) Barrett ad 88–9 takes *θεούς* as the object of *καλεῖν* and *δεσπότης* as an appositive, 'one must call the gods "masters"': he is followed e.g. by J. Glucker, 'Euripides, *Hippolytus* 88,' *CR* 16 (1966), 17 and Halleran. (2) The alternative, taking *δεσπότης* as the object of *καλεῖν* and *θεούς* as an appositive, 'one must call one's masters "gods"', has been proposed and defended by M. West, 'Euripides, *Hippolytus* 88,' *CR* 15 (1965), 156, and 'Euripides, *Hippolytus* 88 again,' *CR* 16 (1966), 274–5, and 'Tragica IV', *BICS* 27 (1980), 9–22, at 10–11, followed e.g. by D. Kovacs, 'Euripides *Hippolytus* 100 and the meaning of the prologue', *CP* 75 (1980), 130–7, at 136 n. 20. At the level of this single sentence, to be sure, both construals are grammatically unexceptionable and can be well supported by parallels (which does not at all mean that the sentence was intended to be irreducibly ambiguous, as suggested by D.N. Levin, 'Euripides, *Hippolytus* 88–89: another possibility', *CB* 47 [1971], 44–5). But the decisive consideration that tips the balance in favour of construction (1) is that at the end of this scene the servant will go on to address Aphrodite as *δέσποινα Κύπρι* (117), evidently putting into practice the general principle he has enunciated at line 88: mortals should reserve this term for gods. After all, Hippolytus himself had done just this when he had addressed Artemis as *δέσποινα* at lines 74 and 82: surely the servant's assertion of this rule in his very first words to his master is a *captatio benevolentiae*, insinuating agreement between master and servant just before the disagreement that the servant knows is about to follow.

⁴⁹ On his identity see the last section of this article.

use these categories (which apparently would have been felt to be inappropriately servile in their mouths) but rather Phaedra's name (566) or *φίλα* (591) or *γύναι* (572).⁵⁰ So it would be anomalous if these free-born Trozenian women were to speak to Phaedra in these terms, whereas it is entirely appropriate for Phaedra's nurse, her own slave, to do so. If so, then the nurse's reference to herself with the words *δέσποινα*, *τῆς σῆς προσπόλου*, echoes Hippolytus' furious *καὶ σὺ καὶ δέσποινα σή*, addressed to her only a few lines earlier (662).

Such a self-reference without a first-person pronoun is perfectly acceptable in the language of drama, especially in Euripides, though it may very well have been precisely what helped induce the mistaken assignment in the first place. We find exactly the same textual situation at *IT* 798–9, where Orestes' expression of a desire to embrace Iphigenia, whom he has recognised, is met with the following rejoinder:

ξέν', οὐ δικαίως τῆς θεοῦ τὴν πρόσπολον
χραίνεις ἀθίκτοις περιβαλὼν πέπλοις χέρα.

L attributes these lines to the chorus; but Monk reassigned them to Iphigenia. He has been followed, rightly, by Mastronarde,⁵¹ Diggle,⁵² Kovacs,⁵³ and Cropp,⁵⁴ and, though with some hesitation, by Kyriakou.⁵⁵ Despite Telò's reservations, there can be little doubt that Monk's intuition was correct: there is no parallel in tragedy for an intervention of the coryphaeus at this point of an *anagnorisis*, and indeed any third party is entirely out of place at this most critical juncture between the two siblings (Pylades' intervention a few moments earlier helps prepare the climax); and Orestes' answer to these lines is directed to his sister (800–2).⁵⁶ Iphigenia's third-person reference to herself in *IT* is arch, austere, self-controlled: at the very moment that she is being called back to her earlier identity as Agamemnon's daughter and Orestes' sister, she insists, for one last time, upon her more recent role as Artemis' priestess. In *Hipp.*, on the other hand, the nurse's third-person self-reference has a different tone. It seems humble, apologetic, and may be intended by the nurse to palliate her guilt:

⁵⁰ The crucial distinction between second-person address and third-person reference is missed by Musgrave (n. 17), 497 ad 689: 'Phaedram δέσποιναν antea vocaverat Chorus v. 130. ne quis existimet hoc nutrici tantum convenire'.

⁵¹ D.J. Mastronarde, *Contact and Discontinuity: Some Conventions of Speech and Action on the Greek Tragic Stage* (Berkeley-Los Angeles-London, 1979), 95 n. 56.

⁵² J. Diggle (ed.), Euripides *Fabulae Tomus II* (Oxford, 1986²), ad loc.

⁵³ D. Kovacs (ed.), Euripides IV. *Trojan Women, Iphigenia among the Taurians, Ion* (Loeb Classical Library 10) (Cambridge, MA-London, 1999), ad loc.

⁵⁴ M. J. Cropp (ed.), Euripides *Iphigenia in Tauris* (Westminster, 2000), ad loc.

⁵⁵ P. Kyriakou, *A Commentary on Euripides' Iphigenia in Tauris* (Berlin-New York, 2006), 265 ad 798–99.

⁵⁶ The objections in M. Telò, 'Eur. I. T. 798–9: un'attribuzione problematica', *RhMus* 146 (2003), 103–6 to Monk's reassignment of these lines are shrewd and are based upon profound knowledge of Greek tragedy; but they fail to convince. Above all, Telò only considers as possibilities either the sequence first statement then gesture or else first gesture then statement (103–4), but does not examine a third possibility, that both statement and gesture were simultaneous. Furthermore, his expectation (104) that Iphigenia would respond not with a formal appeal to the inviolability of Apollo's priestess but rather with an explicit protest against Orestes' attempt to embrace her (104) underestimates the importance of Iphigenia's sacrality, which adds a further, unappealable reason for refusing Orestes' attempt. Finally, Telò does not really succeed in meeting Mastronarde's two objections against the attribution to the chorus (105–6 n. 10, cf. Mastronarde [n. 51], 95 n. 56). Whether Orestes actually succeeds in embracing Iphigenia or whether, as Telò suggests persuasively (106), we must take the present *χραίνεις* as purely conative, cannot, I think, be decided definitively one way or the other on the basis of the evidence.

she is implying that she was not acting on her own, but as Phaedra's servant. All the more reason for Phaedra to explode with anger at her words.

IV

1045 {Θη.} ὥς ἄξιον τόδ' εἶπας. οὐχ οὕτω θανῇ,
ὥσπερ σὺ σαντῶ τόνδε προύθηκας νόμον.

Hippolytus has just told his father that, if he had discovered that his own son had violated his wife, he would have punished him not merely with exile but with death:

{Ιπ.} καὶ σοῦ γε ταῦτ' ἀρτα θαυμάζω, πάτερ·
εἰ γὰρ σὺ μὲν παῖς ἦσθ', ἐγὼ δὲ σὸς πατήρ,
ἐκτεινά τοί σ' ἂν κοῦ φυγαῖς ἐξημίουν,
εἴπερ γυναικὸς ἡξίους ἐμῆς θιγείν. (1041–4)

How are we to understand Theseus' reply? The first half of line 1045 is interpreted generally as meaning, 'How worthy of you is what you have said!';⁵⁷ the following sentence clearly means, 'You will not die in this way, according to that law which you have laid down for yourself'. But there are two problems with this interpretation. First, it is inexplicable why the second part of the phrase should be in asyndeton: it is not explaining the former one in any way, and based upon its meaning we would expect some strong adversative link.⁵⁸ And second, Hippolytus has just indicated what kind of punishment would seem to him to be an appropriate penalty for the sort of crime of which he is being accused by his father; for his father to use the words ὥς ἄξιον τόδ' εἶπας and to mean by them not that Hippolytus said that something was appropriate for something else but rather that what Hippolytus has said was appropriate for him to have said skews Theseus' reaction to Hippolytus' utterance: Theseus would be responding not to the content of the words that Hippolytus says (which asserted a particular case of appropriateness) but to the relation between their content and the character he attributes to their speaker (which he would be calling appropriate). Of course, such discursive misfits occur frequently in dialogue, even between interlocutors who understand each other far better than Theseus and Hippolytus do. But this oddity may be a signal that the line of interpretation which leads to it is mistaken.

Various emendations have been proposed – εὖ καὶ ἄξιον Nauck, οὐκ ἄξιον Gloël, ὥς δεξιόν Metzger,⁵⁹ ὥς ἀξιῶν Wheeler,⁶⁰ οὐχ ὅμως Giusta⁶¹ – but none is convincing and it would obviously be preferable to rescue the text without emending it. Suppose we take ἄξιον to mean not that Theseus thinks that Hippolytus' utterance is worthy of him but that Theseus acknowledges that Hippolytus thinks that the punishment he named is worthy of the crime. Then we can translate the first part of line 1045 as, 'You have indicated this (i.e. death) as worthy (scil. of this crime)'. That is surely an

⁵⁷ So e.g. Matthiae (n. 18), 87 ad 1042: 'cum exclamazione dictum accipio, *Quam te dignum est quod dicis!*'

⁵⁸ Stockert (n. 3), 228 did not notice the problem. Weil (n. 8), 358, and ed., *Sept tragédies d'Euripide* (Paris, 1879²), 72 noticed the problem but unfortunately tried to solve it by emending to οὐχ' οὕτω δ' ὀλεῖ, a remedy worse than the illness.

⁵⁹ All three cited from N. Wecklein (ed.), *Ausgewählte Tragödien des Euripides für den Schulgebrauch erklärt*, IV: *Hippolytus* (Leipzig, 1908²), 121.

⁶⁰ Cited from Wecklein (n. 9), 81, who attributes οὐκ ἄξιον to Paley.

⁶¹ Giusta (n. 6), 149–50.

improvement on the usual interpretation of these words, but it still leaves us with the difficulty of the asyndeton in the second half of that line. But this problem is easily solved by the simple expedient of understanding the first half of the line as a question and the second half as its answer:

1045 {Θη.} ὥς ἄξιον τόδ' εἶπας; οὐχ οὕτω θαναή...

'Is it as a worthy punishment that you have indicated this? It is not in this way that you will die...' There is of course no difficulty in understanding a yes/no question in Greek as interrogative even in the absence of any explicit interrogative particles (KG 2.522–3 §589.1);⁶² our punctuation corresponds to a certain tone in the speaker's voice which usually leaves no room for doubt in the listener, and any such editorial repunctuation is not an emendation but an interpretation of the transmitted evidence. As for the asyndeton in the second half of the line, this indicates that the words beginning οὐχ οὕτω are the answer to the immediately preceding question; and the fact that the answer puts the manner of Hippolytus' death first as its most emphatic element (and then repeats and elaborates this for further emphasis in line 1046) indicates that in the question too the emphasis was on the manner of punishment, thereby providing further evidence that this is what ὥς ἄξιον refers to. Theseus' reply is more cutting if it shows that he has understood Hippolytus directly.

V

1123 οὐκέτι γὰρ καθαρὰν φρέν' ἔχω, παρὰ δ' ἐλπίδ' ἂν λεύσσω.
ἐπεὶ τὸν Ἑλλανίας φανερώτατον ἀστέρ' Ἀθάνας
εἶδομεν εἶδομεν ἐκ πατρὸς ὀργᾶς
ἄλλαν ἐπ' αἶαν ἰέμενον.

1121 παρὰ δ' ἐλπίδ' ἂ Musgrave : παρὰ δ' ἐλπίδα BVDE : παρ' ἐλπίδα ΩCPLP (παρελ- MP) : τὰ παρ' ἐλπίδα (tum λεύσσω) Hartung λεύσ(σ)ω BVΛ : λεύσ(σ)ων ΩD et V³Tr 1123 ἀθάνας V et Eust. in Il. p. 513.42 : ἀθήνας AL et V³ : ἀθήνης B : ἀθήναις MO : gen. sing. Σ⁽¹⁾ (Σ^{nb} τῆς Ἀττικῆς, cl. Od. 7.80 εὐρυάγνιαν Ἀθήνην) : quid legerit Σ⁽²⁾ incertum (Σ^{nb}(bv) ἐπειδὴ τὸν τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς γῆς φανερώτατον ἀστέρα, καὶ τὰ ἐξῆς; unde ἀστέρα γαίης Hartung)

The mind of the chorus may well have been tainted by the dismal events they have witnessed, but we would hardly expect their theological misgivings to be expressed in solecistic language. In line 1121, Musgrave's palmary emendation restores the syntax elegantly and economically (and has the further advantage of removing one of the troublesome masculine participles that afflict this ode), and it is adopted gratefully by all recent editors. But the conclusion of line 1123 has not yet found so effective a remedy.⁶³

What could it mean to call Hippolytus 'the brightest star of Hellenic Athena'? Traditionally there have been three approaches to understanding this phrase: the genitive which depends upon ἀστέρα has been taken either (1) as the name of a divinity, (2) as the name of a place, or (3) as partitive.

⁶² Anyone bothered (unnecessarily, I believe) by the absence of an interrogative particle may prefer the conjecture μὲν for ὥς; this leads to a slightly different construction for the sentence but results in the same meaning.

⁶³ Stockert (n. 3), 230 judiciously considers the various solutions proposed hitherto and concludes with cruces.

(1) There is certainly no objection in principle to calling Hippolytus, as the favorite of some goddess, her 'star.'⁶⁴ But of which one?

a. The manuscripts, for all their orthographical diversity, clearly designate Hippolytus as 'the star of Hellenic Athena.' But this is certainly impossible: not only would 'Ελλήνιος (an epithet which is almost certainly never applied elsewhere to Athena⁶⁵) here have either to distinguish her, absurdly, from some non-Greek Athena or else to point to some quite irrelevant and unattested pan-Hellenic Athena; but above all, in this play Athena is never associated, closely or indeed at all, with Hippolytus – Athena does not appear physically in the *Hippolytus*, indeed she is not even referred to in it at all except on a couple of occasions and then solely in her function as the patroness of Athens (30, 1459). So to call Hippolytus 'Athena's star' would already be intolerably anomalous, let alone to call him 'Hellenic Athena's star.'⁶⁶

b. If we are looking for some divinity of whom Hippolytus might appropriately be called the star, Artemis is the obvious candidate – after all, she is the only goddess intimately linked with him in the play. But it is not easy to see how a reference to Artemis can be introduced into this passage. Hence the attraction of *Ἀφαίας* proposed independently by Fitton in 1967⁶⁷ and by Huxley in 1971,⁶⁸ and lent prominence by Diggle's adoption of this reading in his Oxford text here and at line 1459.⁶⁹ *Ἀφαία* was the cult title of a goddess on Aegina who was sometimes associated in ancient times with Artemis; Hesychius even defines *Ἀφαία* as ἡ Δίκτυνα, καὶ Ἀρτεμις (α 8533 Latte).⁷⁰ The temple of Aphaea on Aegina lay beside the road that led to the mountain sacred to Zeus Panhellenios (Paus. 2.30.3); hence, it is alleged, the appropriateness of the epithet 'Ελλανίας here in the *Hippolytus*

⁶⁴ Cf. Homer as *Μουσάων ἀστέρα καὶ Χαρίτων* (Alcaeus, *AP* 7.1.8).

⁶⁵ At [Arist.] *de mirab. auscult.* 108.840a28, 34, the manuscripts refer to a temple of *Ἀθηνᾶς 'Ελλανίας* near Metapontum, but Gaisford's and Osann's conjecture *Εἰλενίας* (or *Εἰλενίας*) is virtually guaranteed by the text's assertion that the name of the temple was derived from *εἰλεῖσθαι* (or *εἰλεῖσθαι*); and cf. Suda s.v. *Εἰλενία* (*Ei* 104 Adler) and *Etym. Magnum* s.v. *Εἰλενία* and *Εἰλενία Ἀθηνᾶ* 298.27–30 Gaisf. Indeed, even if the manuscripts were to be followed here, the name would serve only to identify Athena as Hellenic in this Italian context and hence would have no bearing on this passage in Euripides. At Plut. *Lycurg.* 6.2, the manuscripts read *Διὸς Συλλανίου καὶ Ἀθανᾶς Συλλανίας*; Ziegler prints Meineke's *Σκυλλιάνου* and –*ας* in his text and lists as conjectures in his apparatus Bryan's 'Ελλανίου and –*ας*, and Goettling's *Σκυλλαίου* and –*ας*.

⁶⁶ To propose, as does Lloyd-Jones (n. 4), 171 'that 'Ελλανία is a cult-title of Athena at Trozen, otherwise unrecorded,' is to prefer the worst of all possible interpretative combinations, linking Hippolytus with Athena rather than with Artemis and creating *ex nihilo* a cult of Athena in Trozen (where she was not especially worshipped).

⁶⁷ Fitton (n. 3), 33–34.

⁶⁸ G. Huxley, 'Euripides, *Hippolytos* 1120–30,' *GRBS* 12 (1971), 331–3.

⁶⁹ Diggle is followed in both passages in Halleran's text (though not in his translation or commentary); Stockert qualifies this conjecture in his apparatus ad 1123 as 'fort. recte.' I do not discuss 1459 in detail here, as the textual and religious problems raised by the two passages are in fact quite disparate and the only (insufficient) reason to link them is Fitton's conjecture. In any case, most of the objections against *Ἀφαίας* at 1123 apply at 1459 as well: why on earth should Aegina intrude here? At 1459, Stockert's 'Ερεχθέως is certainly worth considering; but perhaps Barrett is right to accept, though with misgivings, the double genitive of city and of goddess in this passage.

⁷⁰ In fact, Hesychius is the only surviving ancient author who directly identifies Aphaea with Artemis. A very small number of other texts closely associate Aphaea and Artemis, but in doing so indicate a different relation between them: Pausanias 2.30.3; Antoninus Liberalis 40.4 (pp. 66–7 Papatomopoulos).

(Pindar calls Zeus Panhellenios *Ἑλλανίος* at *N.* 5.10 and in his Sixth *Paean*, Fr. 52f.125–6 Sn.-M.). Now there is no doubt that if *Ἑλλανίας Ἀφαίας* were a suitable periphrasis for Artemis in this dramatic context, this conjecture would solve our difficulty:⁷¹ in uncials phi is easily confused with theta. But there is just as little doubt that *Ἀφαίας* is not in fact suitable, and that Sommerstein and others are right to reject it.⁷² For unlike ‘Dictynna’, a common alternative name for Artemis found not only in Cretan contexts but throughout Greek literature (so also at *Hipp.* 146, 1130), ‘Aphaea’ is strictly limited to this local cult on Aegina, an island with which Hippolytus has no associations whatsoever. Moreover, the epithet *Ἑλληνίος* is never applied to Aphaea; even if it could be transferred to her metonymically from Zeus, this would either restrict the focus even more irrelevantly to Aegina⁷³ or else convey pan-Hellenic associations that would be neither accurate in general nor germane to this specific context.

(2) If Hippolytus is not the star of a goddess, might he be the star of some place? In fact such a usage is attested only rarely in Greek⁷⁴ – the star of a place is generally not a person but a city⁷⁵ – but it is certainly worth considering here.

a. Some ancient scholars took *Ἑλλανίας φανερώτατον ἀστέρ Ἀθάνας* to mean that Hippolytus was the brightest star not of Athena but of Athens, defending their interpretation of the name of the goddess as being equivalent to the name of her city with reference to *Od.* 7.80, where the phrase *εὐρυνάγουσαν Ἀθήνην* is used to mean ‘Athens with its broad streets.’⁷⁶ But not only does this sole, metrically induced Homeric passage hardly suffice to justify such a strange expression here; what is worse, *Ἑλλανίας* remains an insuperable obstacle, for what sense would it make to speak of Hellenic Athens – perhaps as opposed to Athens, Georgia? It may be that the variant in the manuscripts *MO*, *Ἀθήναις*, is an attempt to smuggle the city of Athens into this line by emendation; if so, it fails both because of the anomalous dative and also, once again, because of *Ἑλλανίας*. Finally, with Athens Hippolytus is associated only indirectly and loosely – it is of Trozen, if of any city, that he might conceivably be called the star, and it would be very odd indeed for this chorus of Trozenian women to identify him instead above all with Athens.

⁷¹ Hdt. 3.59.3 is cited by Diggle in the apparatus ad loc. in defence of this emendation, but in fact provides no support for it at all: the manuscripts’ unanimous reading, *Ἀθηναίης* is fully appropriate for this temple complex, and there is no reason to emend to *Ἀφαίης*, cf. S.M. Medaglia-D. Asheri-A. Fraschetti (edd.), *Erodoto. Le Storie. Vol. III: Libro III* (Milan, 1990), 277 ad 3.59.9–10.

⁷² A.H. Sommerstein, ‘Notes on Euripides’ *Hippolytos*’, *BICS* 35 (1988), 23–41, at 39–40. He is followed e.g. by Halleran, Stockert (n. 3), 230, and Giusta (n. 6), 160.

⁷³ Huxley writes, without noticing that he thereby undermines his argument, ‘Thus in the Saronic context of the *Hippolytos* *Ἑλλανίας ... Ἀφαίας* means specifically Aiginetan Aphaia.’ (n. 68, 332)

⁷⁴ Cf. especially Acontius and Cydippe, *καλοὶ νησάων ἀστέρες ἀμφότεροι* (Callim. Fr. 67.8 Pf.); followed by Hero and Leander, *ἀμφοτέρων πόλιων περικαλλέες ἀστέρες ἄμφω* (Musaeus 22).

⁷⁵ E.g., Delos, *τηλέφαντον κυανέας χθονὸς ἄστρον* (Pind. *Hymn* 1, Fr. 33c.6 Sn.-M.); *Κόρινθος ἄστρον οὐκ ἄσμηον Ἑλλάδος* (Adesp. *TrGF* 128 K.-Sn.); *τὸν μέγαν Ἀκροκόρινθον Ἀχαιϊκόν, Ἑλλάδος ἄστρον* (Polystratus, *AP* 7.297.1); *Κολοφὼν τρυφερῆς ἄστρον Ἰηονίης* (*APlan* 4.295.2); Rome, *ἄστρον τι κοινόν τῆς ὅλης οἰκουμένης* (Ps.-Scymnus 233). A place can also be the star of a deity: Aegina, *Διὸς Ἑλλανίου φαεινὸν ἄστρον* (Pind. *Paean* 6, Fr. 52f.125–6 Sn.-M.).

⁷⁶ Schol. ad *Hipp.* 1123 (120.19–20 Schwartz). Cf. Eust. ad *Il.* p. 513.42–4.

b. Hence it is tempting to search for a solution that would make Hippolytus the star of Trozen. Unfortunately, the text resists emendation in this direction – the only conjecture that anyone has been able to come up with is Sommerstein's transformation of the transmitted 'Ελλανίας φανερώτατον ἀστέρ' Ἀθάνας into Ἀλθηπίας φανερώτατον ἀστέρ' γαίας:⁷⁷ a drastic rewriting of the paradosis, for the sake of an obscure allusion to a minor local legend, attested only in Pausanias (2.30.5), that the original name of the land of Trozen was Ἀλθηπία. It may be doubted that many Athenian spectators, if any, had ever even heard of this Trozenian myth.

c. Another ancient scholium paraphrases the words in question as τὸν τῆς 'Ελληνικῆς γῆς φανερώτατον ἀστέρα, suggesting that some ancient scholars may have taken the phrase to mean that Hippolytus was 'the star of the Hellenic land';⁷⁸ following them, Hartung conjectured ἀστέρα γαίας for ἀστέρ' Ἀθάνας, and his suggestion, despite its palaeographical unattractiveness, has met with some approval.⁷⁹ But this solution is certainly precluded by the words ἄλλαν ἐπ' αἶαν at the end of this sentence.⁸⁰ For if the description of Hippolytus as a star is cast in non-geographical terms, these words mean merely that he has been exiled to some other country (scil. than his own); but if he is called the star of some place, then they can only mean that he has been exiled to a different place from that one. This would make sense if he had been called the star of Trozen or Athens, for he has been exiled from those two cities. But if he is called the star of the Hellenic land, then this could only mean that he has been exiled from all of Greece and compelled to seek refuge in non-Greek, barbarian lands. But this is precisely not the case: Theseus' power extends only to Athens and Trozen, and although he says that he would like to banish Hippolytus beyond the ends of the earth if only he could, it is explicitly and repeatedly asserted that he cannot in fact do so, but can only exile him from those two cities (cf. especially 973–5, 1053–4; also 893, 897–8, 1048–9, 1065). If the chorus have understood Theseus correctly, they cannot now lament that 'the star of Greece' is being exiled to a foreign country. This point may have been recognised by Willink, whose conjecture Ἀθανᾶν, 'from Athens',⁸¹ has at least the merits that it is palaeographically plausible and fits well with ἄλλαν ἐπ' αἶαν – though it is surely ruled out by its obscurity and by the contorted word order that ensues.

(3) A third possibility would be to understand the genitive which depends upon ἀστέρα in a partitive sense: Hippolytus would be the star within some field or category, i.e. of all the representatives of some class he would be the most illustrious. So for example Hypatia can be described in an epigram as ἄχραντον ἄστρον τῆς σοφῆς παιδεύσεως, as 'the unsullied star of wise education', i.e. of all those who participated in philosophical education she was the purest and most illustrious (Pallas, *AP* 9.400.5); or in an Attic inscription of the first–second century A.D. a Seneca can be called Σωκρατικῆς σοφίης ἄστρον, i.e. of all those who practised Socratic philosophy he was the star (*IG* III.770a.3–4 = *II*2.3795.3–4). If we choose to

⁷⁷ Sommerstein (n. 72), 40.

⁷⁸ Schol. ad *Hipp.* 1122 (120.16–17 Schwartz).

⁷⁹ It is accepted by Barthold, Wilamowitz, and Kovacs, and is adopted in the translation and commentary of Halleran (though not in his text).

⁸⁰ Sommerstein (n. 72), 40, makes a similar objection but does not point to the crucial words ἄλλαν ἐπ' αἶαν.

⁸¹ Willink (n. 7), 42; (n. 28), 423–4. Willink himself acknowledges that the word order is an objection to his conjecture.

pursue this line of thought, we will need to find a singular abstract substantive in the genitive which would go with *Ἑλλανίας* and replace *Ἀθάνας*. Hitherto only two suggestions have been made in this direction. Murray tentatively proposed *ἀστέρα γ' ἥβας*, 'the brightest star of Hellenic youth';⁸² the meaning is unexceptionable, but the conjecture is extremely unattractive, distant as it is from the paradosis and disfigured by a stopgap γε. More recently, Giusta has conjectured *ἀστέρα γέννας*, 'the brightest star of the Hellenic race';⁸³ certainly preferable to Murray's conjecture, and good Euripidean usage, but still quite far from the paradosis.

All in all, this third approach seems to be the most promising one, even if the conjectures proposed hitherto along these lines are unconvincing. A better proposal would be *Ἑλλανίας φανερώτατον ἀστέρα φήμας*, 'the brightest star of Hellenic fame,' i.e. of all those who are celebrated among the Greeks Hippolytus is the most illustrious. *φήμη* occurs often in Euripides, including five times elsewhere in this very play (158, 573, 774, 1056, 1466): it designates what is said, ranging from rumour through report to legend. We may take the singular abstract *φήμας* here as equivalent to a concrete plural which would designate the members of this category, *τῶν εὐδοκιμούντων ἐν τῇ φήμῃ τῶν Ἑλλήνων*, just as the epigram for Hypatia, discussed above, can be paraphrased as *ἄχραντον ἄστρον τῶν τὴν σοφίαν παιδεύόντων*, or as the inscription is equivalent to *ἄστρον τῶν τὴν Σωκρατικὴν σοφίαν ἀσκούντων*. In uncials, and with a false word-division, the corruption from *ΑΣΤΕΡΑΦΗΜΑΣ* to *ΑΣΤΕΡΑΘΗΝΑΣ* would be very easy.

A final, delicate question regards the orthography: should we write *φάμας* or *φήμας*? The variety of spellings in the manuscripts at *Hipp.* 1123 does not yield a sure indication of just which form of the word stood at their origin. Moreover, as the following list shows, usage in tragic choral odes and lyric anapaests is quite uncertain, with the manuscripts often divided and with scholars often Doricising conjecturally:⁸⁴

Aesch.	<i>Suppl.</i> 697	<u>φήμα</u>	
Soph.	<i>OT</i> 157	φήμα P, probat Dawe	<u>φάμα</u>
	<i>OT</i> 475	<u>φήμα</u> Lrpa	φάμα pZrt
	<i>Phil.</i> 846	<u>φήμαν</u>	φάμαν Zgt
Eur.	<i>Alc.</i> 1005	<u>φήμαι</u>	φάμαι Monk
	<i>El.</i> 701	<u>φήμαις</u>	φάμαις Dindorf
	<i>Hipp.</i> 158	<u>φήμαν</u> BOV A, -μην MAC	φάμαν Dindorf
	<i>Hipp.</i> 573	<u>φήμα</u>	φάμα Monk
	<i>Hipp.</i> 774	<u>φήμαν</u> M A (-ην C)	φάμαν BOAV
	<i>Ion</i> 180	<u>φήμας</u>	φάμας Dindorf
	<i>Med.</i> 420	φήμα gE, φήμη V ^s	<u>φάμα</u>
	<i>Hec.</i> 176		<u>φάμαν</u>
	<i>Hec.</i> 194	<u>φήμας</u> MFLSa	φάμας ΩξζΤ ^t
	<i>Tro.</i> 216		<u>φάμαν</u>

⁸² Murray prints *ἀστέρ' Ἀθήνας* in his text but concludes his apparatus ad loc. with the words, 'Fortasse γ' ἥβας?'

⁸³ Giusta (n. 6), 160.

⁸⁴ The underlined reading is the one printed in the text by West, Lloyd-Jones and Wilson, or Diggle respectively; the symbols for the manuscripts are theirs. Cf. on this question G. Björk, *Das Alpha impurum und die tragische Kunstsprache. Attische Wort- und Stilstudien* (Uppsala, 1950), 171, 238, 244, 368–70.

So it is uncertain whether *φάμας* or *φήμας* is to be preferred. My slight preference for *φήμας* is based upon the (not decisive) considerations that this is the form that seems better warranted by the usage both of Euripides (including elsewhere in the *Hippolytus*) and of his colleagues, and that conjectural Doricisation may reflect more a modern scholarly concern with orthographic and dialectal standardisation than the surely quite fluid situation in a largely oral, pre-printing poetic context.

VI

1153 {ΑΓΓΕΛΟΣ} ποῖ γῆς ἄνακτα τῆσδε Θησέα μολών
εὐροίμ' ἄν, ὦ γυναῖκες;

Who speaks the messenger's speech? Obviously, the messenger, and this is how the manuscripts identify him. But this identification denotes only his function within the play: to report to the characters, chorus, and audience events that happened off-stage (so Barrett ad 1151). It does not tell us anything about who he is outside of this function. Can we say anything more about him?

The chorus call him an *οπαδὸς Ἱππολύτου* on his entrance (1151) and he himself tells us in his report that he is one of Hippolytus' servants: he is one of the people who obeys the command Hippolytus addresses to his *δμῶες* (1184), he twice uses the first person plural to indicate the group of servants of which he is a member and sets this group in relation to their master (*παρ' αὐτὸν δεσπότην ἐστήσαμεν* 1187; *πρόσπολοι δ' ὕφ' ἄρματος | πέλας χαλινῶν εἰπόμεσθα δεσπότη* 1195–6); in the latter passage he calls this group the *πρόσπολοι*. So he is one of Hippolytus' attending servants. We have already seen one such group of Hippolytus' *πρόσπολοι*: during her prologue Aphrodite saw them approaching with Hippolytus and referred to them as a *πολὺς ... προσπόλων ὀπισθόπους κῶμος* (54–5); they entered with Hippolytus and sang a hymn to Artemis (61–71).⁸⁵ If only for reasons of dramatic economy we would expect Hippolytus to have not two sets of servants but one, so that the servant who enters as messenger at 1153 would most likely be a member of the same group that entered at 58. And in fact Euripides is careful to provide evidence that this is indeed the case: for almost the very last words Hippolytus says to the first group of servants are a command that they comb the horses so that he can exercise them (*καὶ καταψήχειν χρῶν | ἵππους* 110–11), and almost the very first words of the messenger's report indicate that this is precisely what he and his fellows were doing (*ἡμεῖς μὲν ἀκτῆς κυμοδέγμονος πέλας | ψήκτραισιν ἵππων ἐκτενίζομεν τρίχας | κλαίοντες* 1173–5).⁸⁶

⁸⁵ The MSS assign this song to the chorus alone, but Barrett gave it to Hippolytus and the chorus together, and he is followed by Diggle, Kovacs, Stockert, and Halleran. But I see no good reason to doubt the manuscripts' assignment of these lines to the chorus alone: Hippolytus tells his servants not to sing along with him but to follow him and sing (*ἔπεσθ' αἰδίδοντες ἔπεσθε* 58); and he is at pains in his following trimeters to dissociate himself from all other mortals and to claim a special relationship with Artemis. He alone has entered the pure meadow and plucked the garland for her, he alone dedicates it to her, he alone hears her: why should he feel so chummy with his servants as to wish to sing in her honour together with them?

⁸⁶ This already suffices to disprove the notion of A.W. Verrall (ed.), *ΑΙΣΧΥΛΟΥ ΑΓΑΜΕΜΝΩΝ. The 'Agamemnon' of Aeschylus* (London, 1889), 1–li, followed by G.W. Bond, 'A chorus in Hippolytus: manuscript text versus dramatic realism', *Hermathena* 129 (1980) 59–63 and Diggle among others, that the strophes of the preceding choral ode, with their anomalous male participles, are sung by the chorus of Hippolytus' servants. For the messenger's words

This much is evident and is recognised by the commentaries (Barrett ad 1151, Halleran ad 1151–1267). So Wecklein was surely right to suggest, in his critical apparatus to this line, changing the manuscripts' Ἀγγελος to Θεράπων: 'ΑΓΓ.] fort. praestat *θεράπων*, cfr. 1184'.⁸⁷ But I think we can go one step further. Why should Euripides have gone to the trouble of providing all this circumstantial detail if not so as to allow us to characterise the messenger more specifically, not only as a member of a group but also as an individual? In other words, can we tell just which member of the group of servants this messenger is? All that we know about his character is that, despite his consciousness that he is merely a servant and despite his loyalty to Theseus, he has no hesitation in disagreeing openly with the king and speaking out his mind against him with full frankness (δούλος μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε σὼν δόμων, ἄναξ, | ἀτὰρ τοσοῦτον γ' οὐ δυνήσομαί ποτε, | τὸν σὸν πιθέσθαι παῖδ' ὅπως ἐστὶν κακός 1249–51). At the beginning of the play, precisely the same features had characterised one of Hippolytus' servants, an older man who had emphasised his loyalty and subordination to his young master (ἄναξ, θεοὺς γὰρ δεσπότης καλεῖν χρεὼν 88) but had then gone on to criticise, tactfully but frankly, Hippolytus' neglect of Aphrodite (89–105); after Hippolytus' brusque rejection of his entreaties and dismissal of Aphrodite, this servant had concluded the episode by praying to Aphrodite that she not take seriously the young man's brashness (114–20).

Of course, in mythic reality the palace of Trozen might have counted lots of uppity but well-meaning servants. But once again reasons of dramatic economy, at the very least, make it seem most likely that these two servants are meant to be thought to be the very same person:

1153 {Θε.} ποῖ γῆς ἀνακτα τῇσδε Θησέα μολὼν
 εὐροιμ' ἄν, ὦ γυναικες;

Applying Ockham's razor and identifying them with one another not only permits us to reduce the play's dramatic personnel by excluding superfluous non-entities but also invests this messenger with a striking pathos. The very same servant who had warned Hippolytus against the folly of neglecting the gods is now the same one who must report the god-sent destruction of his master; we now see that his criticisms of Hippolytus had never entailed that he felt anything other than love, admiration, and loyalty for him; we recall his last words to Aphrodite and recognise how thoroughly the goddess had disregarded his humane appeal; and when he reports his difficulties in keeping up with Hippolytus' chariot (1243–4) we may remember that he had been characterised earlier as being an old man (107, 114, 118). 'The messenger in Eur. is typically given little character or color' (Halleran ad 1151–1267). True enough; but Euripides is also quite capable, when he wishes, of emulating Aeschylus (*Agamemnon*) or Sophocles (*Antigone*, *Trachiniae*) and adding a few brush strokes so

demonstrate that that chorus has been down at the shore, preparing Hippolytus' horses, during all the time since when they had finished preparing their master's lunch and even after they had heard the news about Hippolytus' exile; none of the other members of that group could possibly have arrived back at the palace in Trozen before the messenger himself does. Verrall's solution to the problem is carefully and exhaustively refuted by Sommerstein (n. 72), 35–39. The problem is a real one; the solution will have to be sought elsewhere.

⁸⁷ Wecklein (n. 9), ad loc. The note in the critical apparatus to this line in Murray is inaccurate and misleading: 'Ἀγγελος] *θεράπων* Wecklein, cl. vv. 88 sq'.

as to characterise as an individual even the bearer of so basic a dramatic function and to deepen emotionally such a tragic moment.⁸⁸

Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa/Chicago

GLENN W. MOST
most@sns.it

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⁸⁸ On messengers in Euripides, see in general G. Erdmann, *Der Botenbericht bei Euripides. Struktur und dramatische Funktion* (Diss. Kiel, 1964), I.J.F. de Jong, *Narrative in Drama: The Art of the Euripidean Messenger-Speech* (Wiesbaden, 1991), and J.M. Marcos Pérez, 'El relato del mensajero en Eurípides: Concepto y estructura', *Minerva* 8 (1994), 77–97. It is perhaps worth adding that Racine, an unsurpassed dramatic craftsman and a very meticulous student of Greek tragedy, chose to give the messenger's report near the end of his *Phèdre* to the very same Thérémène (the aged, admonitory but benevolent servant has here become a tutor) whom he had assigned to be the interlocutor of his Hippolyte at its beginning.